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Introduction
THIS COMMENT WILL LOOK at the recent developments in con-
stitutional jurisprudence emerging from the major gay rights deci-
sions and consider how the developments may apply to poor people.
First, this comment will examine how the attention given to the re-
sponsible procreation argument in the same-sex marriage debate has
the potential to halt its continued use within the welfare context as a
means of promoting marriage as a solution to poverty. Second, the
comment will analyze the breakdown of gender stereotypes resulting
from the rise in the acceptance of non-traditional families and how
this societal change can impact perceptions of single mothers. Third,
this comment will look at the invalidation of the status/conduct dis-
tinction by the United States Supreme Court as it has been applied to
laws targeting homosexuals and how it should also be precluded as a
defense for laws targeting the poor. Finally, this comment will ex-
amine how the expansion of the rational basis standard has the ability
to provide social welfare rights with an avenue for heightened consti-
tutional protection. These unique advancements in the gay rights
movement have the potential to change the landscape of welfare
rights in the United States.
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I. The Same-Sex Marriage Debate
The same-sex marriage debate has been ongoing since 1993,
when Hawaii’s highest court heard the case Baehr v. Lewin,1 and for
the first time in United States history an appellate court ordered the
application of strict scrutiny to a law restricting marriage to opposite
sex couples.2 In recent years, the controversy has become more pro-
nounced. Across the country more states are establishing a right to
same-sex marriage either by legislation or case law,3 and other states
are setting dangerous precedents in the courts.4
The premiere argument that has emerged as a justification for
limiting marriage to opposite sex couples is responsible procreation.5
The basic premise of the argument is that marriage is an incentive to
procreate within a committed relationship, and therefore marriage
should only be permitted in situations where procreation is biologi-
cally possible. Thus, this necessarily only applies to heterosexual
couples who can procreate accidentally. Along with the focus on acci-
dental procreation comes an odd twist on the view of same-sex
couples as parents. Same-sex parents are portrayed by those who ad-
vance this argument as responsible, not needing the hefty 1,138 mari-
tal benefits that would cause them to plan a pregnancy, as they must
plan their pregnancies regardless.6 This argument should seem
counterintuitive given the stereotype of gay promiscuity and the anti-
gay sentiment surrounding the ban on marriage.7 The argument may
sound familiar since it is the same argument Congress has been using
1. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
2. See generally id.
3. Those states include New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Washington, Iowa and New York.
4. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 29–30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Standhardt v.
Super. Ct. ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Conaway v. De-
ane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
5. Julie A Nice, The Descent of Responsible Procreation: A Genealogy of an Ideology 103
(University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2012–09), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990554 (“[R]esponsible procreation . . . has
emerged as the primary defense of the same-sex-marriage ban.”).
6. Id. at 109 (“What is surprising on the ideological level is that the responsible-
procreation defense actually contradicts a well established ideological belief that forms the
underlying basis of the opposition to gay rights. . . . In defending same-sex marriage bans,
however, such organizations are contradicting these historic stereotypes of gays and lesbi-
ans, arguing in effect that same-sex couples have behaved so responsibly in planning and
investing in their families that they do not need the support of marriage.”).
7. Id. (“Those mobilized around opposition to gay rights routinely have charged gay
and lesbian individuals with engaging in sexually promiscuous and irresponsible behavior.
For example . . . the vast majority of homosexual relationships are short-lived and transi-
tory, homosexual couples typically engage in a shocking degree of promiscuity, and there-
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to spend welfare dollars to promote marriage for welfare recipients as
a solution to poverty.8
In 1996, extensive welfare reforms were made at the direction of
President Clinton who was reelected on the promise “to end welfare
as we know it.”9 President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”)10 into law,
resulting in the dismantling of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (“AFDC”)11 and instituting a new program called Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families (“TANF”).12 TANF eliminated the federal
entitlement to welfare benefits and implemented block grants that
were distributed to the states with broad discretion to serve the pur-
pose of the statute.13 TANF did impose restrictions on the block
grants including strict instructions not to use funds to provide assis-
tance for a family for more than sixty months, also preventing benefits
from being distributed to families without children, unmarried teen-
age parents without high school diplomas, and most immigrants.14 In
addition, TANF set forth new goals for welfare including encouraging
the formation and maintenance of two parent families and ending the
dependency of needy families by promoting work and marriage.15
The explicit new goal to promote marriage allowed for a redirec-
tion of funds away from job training and financial assistance into mar-
riage promotion campaigns. Marriage promotion propaganda was
designed to target the infamous single mothers on welfare and steer
the conversation away from the root causes of poverty.16 The cam-
fore they are unsuitable role models for children because of their lifestyle.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
8. See generally Linda C. McClain, Irresponsible Procreation, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996).
9. Barbara Vobejda, Clinton Signs Welfare Bill Amid Division, WASH. POST, Aug. 23,
1996, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/welfare/sto-
ries/wf082396.htm.
10. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R.
3734, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996).
11. See DONALD T. KRAMER, 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 31:3 (2d ed., rev. 2011).
12. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
13. JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON POVERTY LAW: THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE 94 (1st ed. 1997).
14. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2012).
16. Aly Parker, Can’t Buy Me Love: Funding Marriage Promotion Versus Listening to Real
Needs in Breaking the Cycle of Poverty, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 493, 535 (2009)
(“TANF’s goal of promoting marriage is antiquated and ineffective in improving the lives
of Americans. Government money is being wasted to condescendingly teach adults ‘marital
skills’ by untested ‘mentorship’ and counseling programs.”); Daniela Kraiem & Jennifer
Reich, Writing Wrongs in Welfare: Why Legislating Morality Will Not Solve the Crisis of Poverty, 2
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paign for marriage as a solution to poverty focuses on the social signif-
icance marriage has in our society. The campaign highlights the fairy
tale version of marriage.
The largest tool marriage promotion propaganda has at its dispo-
sal is the responsible procreation argument, which is articulated as
encouraging procreation only within marriage. The presumption is
that, if children were only born into marriage, the state would avoid
the burden of supporting single mothers and their children. However,
the strategic focus on a “two is better than one” platform for having
and raising children allowed the proponents of gay marriage to join
the conversation. Marriage promoters steered the conversation away
from poverty and onto marriage, which allowed proponents of gay
marriage to argue they too believed children should be raised in sta-
ble two-parent households bonded in matrimony. In doing so, propo-
nents of gay marriage helped perpetuate the continued demonization
of single mothers by supporting the idea that single mothers are unfit
to raise children on their own.
However, marriage promoters focused the dissemination of the
responsible procreation argument as one that necessarily only
targeted opposite sex couples because of their ability to accidentally
procreate.17 The argument was also tweaked to exclude same-sex
couples by highlighting the ‘necessary’ gender-specific role models
children needed to grow up with.18 Instead of desiring merely two-
parent households, the setting for optimal child rearing consists of
one man and one woman who can teach their children ‘proper’ gen-
der roles.19 These nuances in policy allowed the responsible procrea-
tion argument seamlessly to be used as a justification to deny marriage
to same-sex couples while continuing to be used in an attempt to force
marriage on single mothers.
The responsible procreation argument has become the infamous
justification for denying marriage to same-sex couples.20 Although the
party line is that this argument is based in a desire to protect the well-
U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 6, 10 (1997) (Marriage does not provide a cheap solution to
the complex social issues that create poverty.”).
17. NICE & TRUBECK, supra note 13, at 103 (“To put it succinctly, the responsible-
procreation defense surmises that same-sex couples already procreate responsibly and that
the rights and responsibilities of marriage should be limited to furthering the goal of en-
couraging more responsible procreation by heterosexuals.”).
18. See, e.g., NC Values Coalition, Protect Marriage, available at http://ncvalues.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/Issue-Brief-2.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Edward Stein, The Accidental Procreation Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition
for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI. KENT L. REV. 403 (2009).
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being of children, the true sentiment of the argument remains a de-
sire to reduce welfare costs.21 The state court decisions that have up-
held marriage bans in the last decade provide a clear illustration of
the roots the responsible procreation argument has in welfare
concerns.
In Arizona, the state court of appeals applied rational basis review
to the state’s statute restricting marriage to one man and one woman
after determining that same-sex marriage was not a fundamental
right.22 The court held that the statute was rationally related to the
legitimate government interest in encouraging responsible procrea-
tion.23 As in most analyses considering the legitimacy of responsible
procreation, the court began with the fact that only opposite sex
couples have the ability to procreate within their normal sexual activ-
ity.24 This, the court reasoned, provided the state with a justification
for extending marriage to opposite sex couples as an incentive to only
procreate within committed relationships.25 It follows that this would
also allow a state to decline to extend marriage to same-sex couples
and because of the inability to accidentally procreate, no incentive is
needed to achieve this same goal. However, in Standhardt v. Superior
Court, the court of appeals continued by specifically detailing the con-
cern underlying responsible procreation: children burdening the
state.26 The court stated that:
[t]he State could reasonably decide that by encouraging opposite-
sex couples to marry, thereby assuming the legal and financial obli-
gations, the children born from such relationships will have better
opportunities to be nurtured and raised by two parents within
long-term committed relationships, which society has traditionally
viewed as advantageous for children.27
The connection between the responsible procreation argument
and having parents maintain financial responsibility for their children
cannot be overlooked despite the court’s attempt to focus on the ar-
gument’s benefits for children. Although the court attempted to
demonstrate a concern for children to have the family life “tradition-
21. See David Blankenhorn, Op-Ed., Protecting Marriage to Protect Children, L.A. TIMES
September 19, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/2008/sep/19/opinion/
oe-blankenhorn19.
22. Standhardt v. Super. Ct. ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 460 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003).
23. Id. at 462.
24. Id. at 463–64.
25. Id. at 462–63.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 463.
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ally viewed as advantageous,”28 in the next paragraph of the decision,
the court recognized and yet dismissed the harmful effects of the ban
on the children of same-sex couples.29 The court stated that although
the marriage ban “may result in some inequity for children raised by
same-sex couples, such inequity is insufficient to negate the State’s
link between opposite-sex marriage, procreation and childrearing.”30
Therefore, it is clear that the well-being of children is not the sole
rationale behind the responsible procreation argument.
In Indiana, the court of appeals stated its full agreement with the
Arizona analysis and supplemented that with scholarly commentary
from Canada.31 The court cited the article at length stating that a
“central and probably preeminent purpose of the civil institution of
marriage (and its deep logic) is to regulate the consequences of man/
woman intercourse, that is, to assure to the greatest extent practically
possible adequate private welfare at child-birth and thereafter.”32 The
court supported the article’s argument by stating, that those who
think “marriage law does not require an intent or ability to procre-
ate . . . miss the States’ point that marriage’s vital purpose in our socie-
ties is not to mandate man/woman procreation but to ameliorate its
consequences.”33
These quotes demonstrate the court’s reliance on the premise
that marriage can prevent situations where parents cannot solely fi-
nancially provide for their children. Even in the court’s own words
there is specific attention given to the “protection of unintended chil-
dren.”34 The court supported its finding that responsible procreation
is a legitimate interest with the idea that marriage is meant to “en-
courage male/female couples to procreate within the legitimacy and
stability of a state-sanctioned relationship and to discourage unplan-
ned, out of wedlock births resulting from ‘casual’ intercourse.”35 The
court added a footnote to this quote attempting to explain away the
hostility to single mothers on welfare by pointing to a reliance on ad-
ditional scholarly work.36 The court cited Lynn Wardle whose work
28. Id.
29. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 463.
30. Id.
31. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 29–30 (Ind. App. 2005); Monte Neil Stewart,
Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 132 (2004).
32. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 30 (emphasis in original) (citing Stewart, supra note 31, at
47).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 25 (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 24.
36. Id. at n.11.
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indicated that an increase in out-of-wedlock births has resulted in
higher instances of physical and sexual child abuse, educational fail-
ure, and poverty.37 The reliance on scholarly commentary throughout
the opinion demonstrates that the court not only recognized, but ap-
proved of the ties that the responsible procreation argument has to
the condemnation of welfare.
Further examples establishing the roots of the responsible pro-
creation argument are found in the amicus curie briefs for the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision as to the validity of California’s
same-sex marriage ban (“Proposition 8”).38 Many of the briefs used
social science research to establish the problems associated with being
raised in one-parent households (usually referred to as single mother
households).39 One brief, written by three private citizens, expanded
upon the standard argument for a traditional family by specifically
pointing out that “the social institution of marriage provide[s] social
pressures and incentives for husbands to remain with their wives and
children.”40 The brief also stated that allowing same-sex marriage
would not only “erode people’s adherence to marital norms” but
there would also be costs to society.41 “[F]or as absentee fatherhood
and out-of-wedlock births become common, the need and extent of
governmental policing and social services grows.”42 The amicus went
on to cite a Brookings Institute Study which estimated $229 billon in
welfare expenditures between 1970 and 1996 to “the breakdown in
marriage culture and the resulting exacerbation of social ills: teen
pregnancy, poverty, crime, drug abuse, and health problems.”43
37. Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of
State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 788–90 (2001).
38. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
39. Brief of States of Indiana, Virginia, Louisiana, Michigan, Alabama, Alaska, Florida,
Idaho, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, & Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants Dennis Hollingsworth, et al. & in Support of
Reversal at 18–21, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10–16696,
11–16577), 2010 WL 4075743, at 18–21; Brief of Amici Curiae, Robert P. George, Sherif
Girgis, & Ryan T. Anderson, in Support of Reversal & the Intervening Defendants-Appel-
lants at 9–13 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10–16696, 11–16577),
2010 WL 4075740, at 9–13; Brief of Amicus Curiae Catholics for the Common Good in
Support of Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants at 13–16, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10–16696, 11–16577), 2010 WL 4075754, at 13–16.
40. Brief of Amici Curiae, Robert P. George, Sherif Girgis, & Ryan T. Anderson, in
Support of Reversal & the Intervening Defendants-Appellants at 17, Perry v. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10–16696, 11–16577), 2010 WL 4075740, at 17.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Isabel V. Sawhill, Families at Risk, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE
2000 ELECTION AND BEYOND 97, 108 (Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer eds., 1999)).
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The focus on social harms associated with fatherless homes con-
tinues in other briefs with a paternalistic argument from the National
Organization of Marriage urging that marriage is a solution to pov-
erty.44 The brief argued marriage is necessary to encourage both par-
ents to assume responsibility for raising a child so as to “mitigat[e] the
gendered inequality which frequently occurs when single mothers
bear the burdens of parenting alone.”45 The brief went on to explain
the danger of a society that allows children to believe fathers are un-
necessary for their well-being.46 Thus, their argument appears to be
that marriage needs to be based on the premise of responsible procre-
ation, not only to ensure that the value of fathers is not lost on chil-
dren, but also so that fathers don’t forget that parentage is not a
choice. Specifically, the brief pointed out, “[o]nce the two parent
norm loses its moral sanctity, the selfish considerations that always pul-
led poor parents apart often become overwhelming.”47 This quote
makes it clear that the National Organization of Marriage sees single
mothers raising children as a greater evil than children in unhappy or
unsafe two-parent marital homes.
Many of the briefs in support of Proposition 8, as well as the state
marriage cases discussed above, supported the responsible procrea-
tion argument with the link between marriage and procreation, citing
landmark cases Skinner v. Oklahoma,48 Loving v. Virginia,49 and Zablocki
v. Redhail.50 For example, in the Washington same-sex marriage ban
decision the Court relied on the perception that “Skinner, Loving, and
Zablocki indicate, marriage is traditionally linked to procreation and
the survival of the human race.”51 Opponents of same-sex marriage
44. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization for Marriage, National Organiza-
tion for Marriage Rhode Island, & Family Leader in Support of the Intervening Defend-
ants-Appellants at 16, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10–16696,
11–16577), 2010 WL 4075750, at 16.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Id. at 17–18; see also Brief in Support of Appellants at 20–23, Perry v. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10–16696, 11–16577), 2010 WL 4075744 at 20–23. The
amicus brief written by the American College of Pediatricians made similar arguments
about the social harms of undermining societal efforts to persuade fathers to take responsi-
bility for their children. Id.
47. Id. at 20 (quoting Christopher Jencks, Deadly Neighborhoods, NEW REPUBLIC, June
13, 1998, at 30).
48. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
49. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
51. Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006).
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argue that this link establishes responsible procreation as a valid argu-
ment to deny marriage.52
However, Zablocki does not stand for the link between procrea-
tion and marriage. Rather, it specifically held that a law denying mar-
riage with the intention of providing an incentive to responsibly
procreate was invalid.53 In Zablocki, a Wisconsin statute required re-
sidents to obtain court ordered permission to get married if they had
not paid their child support obligations.54 In addition, the statute re-
quired proof that the out-of-custody children were not likely to be-
come public charges in the future.55 Mr. Redhail had not paid his
support obligations for a child he fathered in high school when he
filed for a marriage license in 1974 and he was subsequently rejected
due to this Wisconsin statute.56
The Court analyzed the statute under equal protection57 and ap-
peared to apply strict scrutiny on the basis that the right to marry has
been firmly established as fundamental.58 The State put forth two in-
terests to justify the statute’s classification: requiring court ordered
permission to marry furnished an opportunity to counsel applicants
about fulfilling their support obligations and protected the welfare of
out-of-custody children.59 The Court was willing to accept the interests
but found that the statute was not an appropriate way of achieving
them as the statute “unnecessarily impinged” on the right to marry.60
First, as to the counseling objective, the Court held that the stat-
ute did not further this interest because there was no express provi-
sion for any counseling in the actual text of the statute.61 Second, as to
the welfare of out-of-custody children, the Court aptly stated that the
State “does not make clear the connection between the state’s interest
and the statute’s requirements.”62 Just as in the same-sex marriage
cases discussed above, the State phrased their interest as a concern for
the welfare of children, however, when articulated the interest
52. See, e.g., Robert Sokolowski, The Threat of Same Sex Marriage, AMERICA (JUNE 7,
2004), http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=3627.
53. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389–91.
54. Id. at 375.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 377–78.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
58. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388–90. The Court undertook a “critical examination” of the
state interests advanced to justify the statute.
59. Id. at 388.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 388–89.
62. Id. at 389.
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emerged as one of concern for the fiscal burden on the state.63 The
State argued that the Wisconsin statute provided an incentive for peo-
ple to make their child support payments and would prevent people
from incurring new support obligations.64 Thus, the State argued that
the ban on marriage was justified if it encouraged people to respon-
sibly procreate, meaning if it provided an incentive to take financial
responsibility for their children.65
This language is strikingly similar to the language used to deny
marriage to same-sex couples, where the argument is again that deny-
ing marriage to some is acceptable if it encourages responsible procre-
ation. However, the Court in Zablocki held that this interest was not
sufficiently furthered by the marriage ban and the statute was uncon-
stitutional for the outright infringement on the fundamental right to
marry.66 The Court stated that “if the State believes that parents of
children out of their custody should be responsible for ensuring that
those children do not become public charges” the interest can be
achieved without infringing on the right to marry and instead sug-
gested adjusting support orders.67
The Zablocki decision demonstrates that the connection between
procreation and marriage is not that they are linked in a fashion that
would justify limiting marriage for reasons associated with procreation
but rather that they are equally protected rights.68
In recognizing the fundamental right to marry, the Court explic-
itly articulated the right as separate and distinct from the right to
make decisions about procreation.69 The Court relied on the strict
63. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist highlighted the social welfare con-
cerns and advocated for Dandridge’s rational basis review. He concluded that the statute was
“sufficiently rationale” despite the “possible imprecision.” Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 407–09
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 389–90.
65. Id. at 388.
66. Id. at 390–91.
67. Id. at 390.
68. Nice, supra note 5 at 22 (“The Court in Zablocki specifically justified marriage pro-
tection as a fundamental right on the basis that marriage should receive ‘equivalent protec-
tion’ as procreation receives. In short, the importance of marriage led to
treating procreative decision-making as a fundamental right in Griswold, which could not
be denied unequally in Eisenstadt and Carey, while the importance of procreative decisions
led to treating marriage as a fundamental right in Zablocki. In other words, the Court
has recognized that marriage and procreation are independent aspects of liberty and has
relied on the constitutional protection of each to justify the constitutional protection of
the other.”).
69. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. The Court stated that the “decision to marry has been
placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth,
child rearing, and family relationships.” Id.
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protections pertaining to the right to procreate to legitimatize the
strong protections the Court gave to the right to marry. Specifically,
the Court stated that “. . . if appellee’s right to procreate means any-
thing at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in
which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations to take place.”70
Therefore, in addition to the explicit holding, the way in which the
Court addressed the right to marry and the right to procreate further
demonstrates that responsible procreation is not inextricably tied to
the right to marry.
The use of the responsible procreation argument within the
same-sex marriage debate is demonstrably linked to views on welfare
reform. It is the same argument used within the welfare context in an
attempt to deflect from the causes of poverty and instead put forth
marriage as the solution.71 However, the link between marriage and
procreation was called into question in Zablocki. The case brought to-
gether the marriage debate and the desire to hold parents responsible
for their children but the Court held the right to marriage could not
be limited by the responsible procreation argument.72 Not only has
Zablocki made the case for separating the right to marry from the abil-
ity to procreate, but current administrative choices on the state and
federal level have also called the legitimacy of the responsible procrea-
tion argument into question.
On the state level, in California’s fight over Proposition 8, where
responsible procreation emerged as the foremost argument, high-
level officials refused to defend on appeal the marriage ban enacted
by voters. The Attorney General of California, Kamala Harris, as well
as the Governor of the State, Jerry Brown, both declared that Proposi-
tion 8 was unconstitutional and that they would not appeal the district
court decision, finding Proposition 8 unconstitutional.73 Further-
more, on the federal level, the Obama Administration declared it
would no longer defend the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).74
70. Id. In 1978 the State of Wisconsin still punished fornication as a criminal offense.
WIS. STAT. § 944.15 (1973).
71. See Standhardt v. Super. Ct. ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 462–63 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003).
72. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389–91.
73. See Press Release, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General Kamala D.
Harris Issues Statement on Prop. 8 Ruling (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://oag.ca.gov/
news/press_release?id=2579&y=2011&m= (“I firmly believe that Proposition 8 violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution and am confident that
justice will prevail.”).
74. Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Statement of the
Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act, Department of Jus-
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United States Attorney General, Eric Holder, released a memoran-
dum stating that it was the opinion of the administration that DOMA
is unconstitutional under heightened scrutiny.75
Both of these public denouncements as to the constitutionality of
denying same-sex couples the right to marry demonstrate that there is
a growing recognition of the illegitimacy of the responsible procrea-
tion argument. With the acceptance that the same-sex marriage bans
are unconstitutional comes the fall of the main argument in support
of limiting marriage. In the context of marriage, both Zablocki’s ex-
plicit holding and the refusal to defend marriage bans by high rank-
ing officials, show that responsible procreation as an argument is on
its way out. However, responsible procreation now sits as the founda-
tion for welfare reforms that have channeled money into promoting
marriage and away from giving actual help to families in need. With
the advances in the same-sex marriage debate there is hope that the
reliance on responsible procreation will cease in the welfare context
as well, resulting in future policy choices which provide effective assis-
tance to families.
II. The Rise of Non-Traditional Families
“In 1971, for the first time in our Nation’s history, this Court
ruled in favor of a woman who complained that her State had denied
her the equal protection of its laws.”76 Since Reed, the Court has re-
peatedly recognized that equal protection prohibits laws that “den[y]
to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-
equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to
society based on their individual talents and capacities.”77 Justice Gins-
berg wrote these words in United States v. Virginia,78 where the Court
tice, Office of Public Affairs, (February 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html (“[T]he President has concluded that given a number
of factors, including a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sex-
ual orientation should be subject to a more heightened standard of scrutiny. The President
has also concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to legally married same-sex
couples, fails to meet that standard and is therefore unconstitutional. Given that conclu-
sion, the President has instructed the Department not to defend the statute in such
cases.”).
75. Id.
76. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 73 (1971) (holding unconstitutional an Idaho Code prescription that stated males must
be preferred to females in the administration of a decedent’s estate when there are equally
competing claims)).
77. Id.
78. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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invalidated the Virginia Military Institute’s (“VMI”) all male admission
policy.79 Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion not only struck down the
unequal admissions policy but it recognized the deeply rooted gender
role stereotypes that facilitate laws that draw sex-based
classifications.80
However, even with recognition of the problem at the highest
level, stereotypes about gender roles and generalizations about one’s
abilities based on sex influence laws and policy.81 The strategic policy
choices made in the context of welfare highlight this phenomenon.
The constant media portrayals of “welfare queens” that demonize sin-
gle mothers are rooted in the perceptions of the proper roles men
and women are meant to fulfill in society. The emphasis on marriage
as a means to bring women out of poverty makes this abundantly
clear. In addition, the structure of family law statutes also underscores
the idea that laws are built upon the thinking that men are the bread-
winners and women are simply not. Statutes pertaining to the determi-
nation of parentage are written as ways to determine which man will
be financially responsible for the child and, until recently, these stat-
utes were not adaptable to determining maternity.82
The last decade has shown a new adaptation of family law statutes
to accommodate the reality of same-sex couples raising children who
previously had absolutely no avenue to formalize that relationship.
These changes reflect the growing acceptance of non-traditional fami-
lies and it is this acceptance that is helping to break down gender
roles. The advancements gained in family law by same-sex couples
have the ability to further alter the perception of an acceptable family,
which can benefit single mothers in the welfare context as well. The
perception that the nuclear family is the only acceptable family struc-
ture is one of the strong forces behind the depiction of single mothers
as the problem.83 With the growing acceptance of non-traditional fam-
ilies, perceptions of strict gender roles will continue to break down
and hopefully change the way society views the single mother’s role in
the welfare arena.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. But see Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding a law requiring
fathers but not mothers to prove a bond with their child in order for the child to receive
citizenship).
82. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
83. Sheryl L. Howell, How Will Battered Women Fare Under the New Welfare Reform?, 12
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 140, 141 (1997); see also Nadine Taub, Welfare Reform: An Attack on
Us All, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 260 (1996).
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One of the leading states in the recognition of non-traditional
families is California. In 2005, the California Supreme Court decided
three family law cases that recognized the parentage of two natural
mothers for a child, each under different circumstances.84 In Elisa B.,
the Court determined that Elisa was the second natural mother of
twin girls her partner had conceived while the two were in a commit-
ted relationship, and was thus responsible for child support.85 In this
case, Elisa and her partner were in a committed relationship when
both of them used the same sperm donor to conceive children. After a
break-up, Elisa refused to continue supporting the twin girls that her
partner had biologically conceived although she had raised them for a
year. The California Supreme Court held that “[a] person who ac-
tively participates in bringing children into the world, takes the chil-
dren into her home and holds them out as her own, and receives and
enjoys the benefits of parenthood, should be responsible for the sup-
port of those children—regardless of her gender or sexual
orientation.”86
In Kristine H., the court ruled on estoppel grounds that Kristine
was prohibited from challenging a judgment of parenthood that she
and her partner had obtained before she gave birth to a daughter who
they intended to raise together.87 Kristine and her partner were in a
committed relationship when they decided for Kristine to get preg-
nant through artificial insemination. Before their daughter was born
they obtained a judgment of parentage establishing that they were
both the legal mothers of the child based on their intention to procre-
ate.88 After raising the child for almost two years the couple broke up
and Kristine brought an action to vacate the judgment and keep their
daughter away from her ex-partner. Although the Court declined to
rule on the validity of the actual judgment of parenthood, it prohib-
ited Kristine from challenging the court order because she was a party
to the original action.89
84. See Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.
2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005).
85. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670.
86. Id. (internal quotations omitted). However, because the Court relies on CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7611(d), which is a rebuttable presumption of parentage, this statement is limited
to the context where there are no competing claims to parentage. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7611(d) (West 2012).
87. Kristine H., 117 P.3d 690, 695.
88. Id. at 692.
89. Id.
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Finally, the Court heard K.M. v. E.G.90 and again held that a child
could have two legal and natural mothers.91 In this case, K.M. and
E.G. were registered domestic partners when they decided to use arti-
ficial reproductive technology to create a child linked to both of
them. E.G. was implanted with K.M.’s eggs, which were fertilized by a
sperm donor, resulting in E.G. as the gestational mother and K.M. as
the genetic mother of twin girls. After five years of raising the children
together, the couple broke up and the lower court found that K.M.
had no legal parental rights. The lower court based its decision on the
fact that K.M. signed the standard ovum donation documents, which
relinquished parental rights, to be able to give her eggs to E.G.92 How-
ever, the California Supreme Court held that K.M. was the second le-
gal mother of the twins because the couple raised the children
together which showed that it was not a situation of standard egg do-
nation or surrogacy.93 Therefore, K.M. did not contract out of her
responsibilities to her genetic children.94
In addition to the California Supreme Court’s decision to recog-
nize two natural mothers, there have also been cases establishing that
the current family law statutes apply equally to both genders. First,
Elisa B. demonstrates that the presumptions of parentage are gender
neutral and are applicable to determining maternity as well as pater-
nity.95 Further, a California court of appeals recognized the limita-
tions of meeting the standard articulated in Elisa B. given the realities
of low social acceptance of same-sex couples in some areas of the
country.96 In S.Y. v. S.B.,97 the court held that S.Y. was the second
legal mother of two children her partner had adopted during their
relationship, under the same presumption of parentage as Elisa B.98
However, in this case, S.Y. was in the military and, because of “don’t
ask don’t tell”, she maintained a separate residence and never formal-
ized her relationship with either her partner or the children. The
court held that due to the wealth of evidence that demonstrated S.Y.’s
90. 117 P.3d 673 (2005).
91. Id. at 675.
92. Id. at 677.
93. Id. at 677–78.
94. Id.
95. See generally Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 7611(a)–(d) (West 2012) (presumptions of parentage).
96. S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2011).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 3; Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660.
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“blended home” with her partner and children, S.Y. was their legal
mother.99
Second, in addition to the gender neutral reading of the parent-
age presumptions outlined in Family Code section 7611, California
courts have also extended step-parent adoption to include gender
neutral second parent adoption.100 In Sharon S. v. Superior Court,101
Sharon S. had two children through artificial reproductive technology
while in a committed relationship with her partner. For the oldest
child, the couple signed documents that effectuated the independent
adoption of the child by the non-biological partner but attached an
addendum, which indicated the intent that Sharon would retain her
rights as the biological mother. While replicating this process for the
second child, the couple broke up and Sharon withdrew her support
for the independent adoption. Therefore, the California Supreme
Court had to decide whether the intent not to terminate the biologi-
cal mother’s parental rights voids the adoption.102 The Court held
that termination of the birth parent’s rights is not mandatory for every
adoption and that second parent adoptions are allowed under the in-
dependent adoption laws.103
Furthermore, California courts have recognized non-traditional
families by consistently recognizing the intent of parties in determin-
ing parentage in surrogacy cases.104 In Johnson v. Calvert,105 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court determined that when there are equally valid
competing claims to parentage the court will decide based on the in-
tent of the parties.106 In this case the surrogate decided she wanted to
keep the baby and the Court recognized her parentage claim as the
gestational mother. However, the Court recognized that the baby’s ge-
netic mother was also her natural mother, and thus had a valid legal
claim. Therefore, the Court looked to the intent of the parties at the
time of conception and found that the genetic mother was the child’s
legal mother.107 In a subsequent case, the court of appeals applied the
intent test in a surrogacy case in which the legal parents had no ge-
99. S.Y., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 9–10.
100. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a)–(d) (West 2012); Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d
554 (2008).
101. 73 P.3d 554 (2008).
102. Id. at 558.
103. Id. at 566–67.
104. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
105. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
106. Id. at 777–78.
107. Id.
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netic connection to the child.108 In In re Marriage of Buzzanca,109 the
court determined that because the child was conceived with the help
of medical technology at the direction of the Buzzancas, their intent
caused them to be the legal parents of the child born to a surrogate,
despite the fact that they were not genetically related.110
By upholding the intent of the parties in surrogacy cases, Califor-
nia courts allow non-traditional families to be formed and protected.
Further, all of the advancements made in the recognition of families
that are not heterosexual married couples with biological children,
provide an avenue to defend against societal perceptions that the opti-
mal setting for raising children is the nuclear family. The argument
for the optimal setting for child rearing has been prominent in the
same-sex marriage debate alongside responsible procreation.111 The
ongoing battle for same-sex marriage provides a stage to discuss the
fallacies involved with perpetuating the myth that for children to be
successful they need to grow up with one father and one mother who
preferably are genetically related to them. Within the same-sex mar-
riage cases, many courts have taken judicial notice of the social sci-
ence evidence that demonstrates children raised by same-sex parents
are just as happy and healthy as those raised by heterosexual par-
ents.112 In addition, the rise of judicially sanctioned non-traditional
families also provides a platform for the discussion that the sex of the
parent does not determine the outcome of the child because “proper”
gender roles should not be the focus of a child’s well-being.
These advancements have important implications in the welfare
context because it is these perceptions about gender roles that drive
108. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
109. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (1998).
110. Id. at 291–92.
111. See, e.g., Timothy J. Dailey, Homosexual Parenting: Placing Children at Risk, ORTHO-
DOXYTODAY.ORG, http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles/daileygayadopt.php (last visited
Oct. 16, 2011).
112. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2010) aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The gender of a child’s parent is not a
factor in a child’s adjustment. The sexual orientation of an individual does not determine
whether that individual can be a good parent. Children raised by gay or lesbian parents are
as likely as children raised by heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and well-ad-
justed. The research supporting this conclusion is accepted beyond serious debate in the
field of developmental psychology.”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899 (Iowa 2009)
(“Plaintiffs presented an abundance of evidence and research, confirmed by our indepen-
dent research, supporting the proposition that the interests of children are served equally
by same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents.”).
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the continued demonization of single mothers.113 With contraception
and marriage available as an avenue of retreat from this misrepre-
sented category, society sees single mothers on welfare as incompre-
hensible.114 The language surrounding welfare reform is laced with
the intention to separate the deserving poor from the undeserving
poor and it is the stereotypes associated with welfare mothers that re-
inforce their place on the undeserving side.115 The media perpetuates
images of single mothers on welfare as sexually deviant and lazy.116
Emphasizing that single mothers are responsible for their poverty, the
blame for social welfare is placed on single mothers alone.117 Thus,
society sees single mothers as choosing to be on welfare because they
do not choose to get married.118 The idea that a man is necessary to
successfully raise a child is the foundation for promoting marriage as
a solution to poverty. It is founded on the notion that men and wo-
men have separate and distinct roles to play in society and that par-
ents are responsible for teaching their children how to align their sex
with the appropriate gender behaviors. Therefore, breaking down
these gender role stereotypes can help to change society’s thoughts
about single mothers on welfare and social welfare policy generally.
III. The Status/Conduct Distinction
The defense of targeting conduct rather than a person’s status
has been used to justify laws challenged as discriminatory. In recent
years, the debate over what constitutes targeting conduct versus one’s
status has played out in sexual orientation discrimination cases.119 Per-
haps the most well known of these cases is Lawrence v. Texas,120 either
because of the controversial nature of the law challenged or because
of the standing precedent it overturned.121 Either way, Lawrence has
113. See generally Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19
(1995).
114. Helen M. Alvare, Beyond the Sex-Ed Wars: Addressing Disadvantaged Single Mothers’
Search for Community, 44 AKRON L. REV. 167, 168 (2011).
115. Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales:
Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 HOW. L.J. 473 (1995).
116. Id. at 484 (“Welfare reform rhetoric portrays women receiving public assistance as
unwilling to work and lacking the American work ethic.”); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites
and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1159 (1995).
117. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 115.
118. Kraiem & Reich, supra note 16, at 10.
119. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S.
Ct. 2971 (2010).
120. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
121. Id.
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become symbolic of the change in popular opinion as to the equal
rights of gays. The “emerging awareness,” as Justice Kennedy wrote in
the majority opinion, underscores the decision to strike down Texas’
same-sex sodomy ban on substantive due process grounds.122
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy refused to decide Law-
rence on the narrower grounds of equal protection utilized by Justice
O’Connor in her concurring opinion.123 Although the law would
likely violate the Equal Protection Clause under Romer v. Evans,124 to
decide on those grounds alone would distinguish the case from Bowers
v. Hardwick125 and leave unresolved whether a sodomy ban targeting
both heterosexuals and homosexuals would be invalid.126 Therefore,
Justice Kennedy focused on the liberty interest protected within the
Due Process Clause, leaving most of the discussion of the status/con-
duct distinction to Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion.127
The majority opinion did however articulate that “[w]hen homosex-
ual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration
in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to dis-
crimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”128 This
sentiment underscores the argument Justice O’Connor made by high-
lighting the connection between the targeted conduct, same-sex sod-
omy, and the targeted class of persons—homosexuals.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor focused on the lack
of a legitimate governmental interest to support the disparate treat-
ment that the law enforces.129 The state of Texas argued that rational
basis is satisfied by its interest in the promotion of morality, but Justice
O’Connor made it explicitly clear that moral disapproval was not a
valid justification for a law.130 Justice O’Connor explained that the
Texas sodomy law, especially given the justification put forth, “raise[s]
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of ani-
mosity toward the class of persons affected.”131 In response, Texas as-
serted that the law did not discriminate against homosexual persons,
only against homosexual conduct.132 Justice O’Connor’s next com-
122. Id. at 572; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
124. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
125. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
126. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575–76.
127. Id. at 593–96.
128. Id. at 575.
129. Id. at 582–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 583 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 634 (1973)).
132. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583.
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ments laid the foundation for undermining the State’s argument dis-
tinguishing between targeting status and conduct as it relates to
homosexuals in Lawrence and all future cases:
While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct
targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being
homosexual. Under such circumstances, Texas’ sodomy law is
targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay
persons as a class. “After all, there can hardly be more palpable
discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines
the class criminal.”133
Justice O’Connor’s language clearly demonstrates that laws that
target conduct inextricably connected to one’s status are invalid.
The topic of conduct and status once again reared its head in the
recent United States Supreme Court case, Christian Legal Society v. Mar-
tinez.134 In this case, the Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) chapter
brought a challenge against the University of Hastings College of
Law’s non-discrimination policy that required all student groups to
allow any student to join. Once again the Court made clear that the
conduct/status distinction is not recognized in the context of sexual
orientation discrimination.135 Justice Ginsberg relied on both Justice
Kennedy’s and Justice O’Connor’s words in Lawrence in rejecting
“CLS’s attempt to distinguish between discriminating against gays
based on their status (which CLS denied doing) and merely excluding
gays based on conduct and/or belief (which CLS defended).”136
When the conduct defines the class there can be no meaningful dis-
tinction; therefore it is unacceptable to target homosexuals for dis-
crimination by outlawing conduct associated with their identity.
By extension it is reasonable to argue that it is unacceptable to
target poor people by outlawing conduct that is unavoidable given
their status as impoverished. The status-crimes doctrine, rooted in the
Eighth Amendment’s137 prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment, provides an avenue to advance this argument.138 The status-
crimes doctrine was established in Robinson v. California139 in 1962
133. Id. (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 641 (1973)).
134. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
135. Id.
136. Julie A. Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment of CLS v. Martinez, 38
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 647 (2011).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
138. Rob Tier, Restoring Order in Urban Public Spaces, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 255, 266
(1998); Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official
Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons From American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 660 (1992).
139. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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when the Court invalidated a statute that criminalized being addicted
to narcotics.140 The California statute criminalized only the status of
being an addict without requiring proof of use or even possession of
narcotics.141
In striking this down, the Court made clear that punishment of
individuals based solely on their status violated the Eighth Amend-
ment. The Court went further by establishing that criminalizing “gen-
uinely involuntary conduct resulting from status constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment” as well.142
Although Robinson set forth this strong precedent, the Court de-
cided not to extend the status-crimes doctrine to chronic alcoholism
in the subsequent case of Powell v. Texas.143 In Powell, the Court sub-
stantially narrowed the broad protection established in Robinson and
upheld the conviction of a man who was charged with public intoxica-
tion despite his Eighth Amendment claim that the conviction pun-
ished him for being a chronic alcoholic.144 In the plurality decision,
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment only prohibited punish-
ment without proof of a criminal act.145 Thus, the Court distinguished
the facts from Robinson by describing the public drunkenness as con-
duct that endangered the public as opposed to the mere status of be-
ing intoxicated while being an alcoholic.146
However, this narrow holding did not destroy the status-crimes
doctrine for future cases. Justice White’s concurring opinion demon-
strated that he was willing to accept that alcoholism is a status that
should not be punished.147 He agreed with the four dissenting Justices
that the defendant’s intoxication was an involuntary result of his alco-
holism, however he did not find that this alcoholism compelled the
defendant to appear in public.148 Therefore, Justice White agreed in
the judgment to uphold the conviction of Powell on these narrow
grounds only.149 Justice White continued that he believed a showing
could be made that a homeless alcoholic would have no choice but to
140. Id. at 666.
141. Id.
142. Simon, supra note 138, at 283, n.123.
143. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion).
144. Id. at 531–32.
145. Id. at 533 (“[C]riminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has commit-
ted some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing, or
perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus.”).
146. Id. at 532.
147. Id. at 548–49 (White, J., concurring).
148. Powell, 392 U.S. at 549–50.
149. Id. at 553–54.
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appear intoxicated in public; therefore the statute in Powell as applied
to them would be prohibited.150
This hypothetical homeless alcoholic emerged in California in
2004; however the court of appeals rejected the status argument de-
spite Justice White’s concurring opinion in Powell.151 In Kellogg, the
defendant was found intoxicated sitting in bushes on a freeway em-
bankment when he was arrested for public drunkenness.152 The court
distinguished the statute at issue from the one in Powell by pointing to
the specificity with which California’s statute was written to address
only publically intoxicated persons who pose a safety hazard or ob-
struct a public way.153 The court held that “[t]he statute does not pun-
ish the mere condition of being a homeless, chronic alcoholic but
rather punishes conduct posing a public safety risk.”154 Therefore, the
court found that the Eighth Amendment was not violated in this
case.155 Although this case circumvented Justice White’s hypothetical
application of the status-crimes doctrine to homeless alcoholics, his
sentiment has not been lost.156 Justice White’s concurrence stated that
there is involuntary conduct associated with homelessness, which, if
criminalized, may be unconstitutional for targeting the status of being
homeless.157 The idea that criminalizing conduct consequent to being
homeless would be unconstitutional mirrors the sentiments expressed
in invalidating the status/conduct distinction used in reference to
homosexuals. Making use of Lawrence’s argument for homeless per-
sons is the first step towards rightfully applying it to the status of being
poor generally.
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit finally applied Robinson to the status of
homelessness.158 In Jones, a group of homeless individuals sought in-
junctive relief from the enforcement of a Los Angeles statute that
criminalized sleeping, lying or sitting on public streets at all times.159
The court held that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment be-
150. Id. at 551.
151. See People v. Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507 (Ct. App. 2004).
152. Id. at 508.
153. Id. at 513.
154. Id. at 508.
155. Id. at 516.
156. See Shirley Darby Howell, Domestic Violence, Flawed Interpretations of 42 U.S.C.
§1437d(L)(6), Sexual Harassment in Public Housing, and Municipal Violations of the Eighth
Amendment: Making Women Homeless and Keeping Them Homeless, 13 JONES L. REV. 1 (2008).
157. Powell, 392 U.S. at 551 (White, J., concurring).
158. Jones v. L.A., 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th
Cir. 2007).
159. Id. at 1120.
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cause it criminalized the status of being homeless by punishing invol-
untary acts that were an integral part of the status of being
homeless.160 The court based its rationale on the evidentiary proof
that Los Angeles did not have enough shelters to accommodate all of
the homeless people in the county.161 Therefore, the city was prohib-
ited from punishing homeless persons for sleeping on public streets
when they had no other choice by virtue of their status of being home-
less.162 Sleeping, lying and sitting are all involuntary acts which
humans must perform to survive and homeless persons have no
choice but to do so in public.163 Therefore, it was unconstitutional for
the city to enforce the ban at all times and in all places.164
Unfortunately, the Jones decision lacks precedential weight as it
was vacated due to a settlement between the parties.165 However, the
sentiment expressed in Jones should be used in future cases to obliter-
ate the status/conduct distinction that continues to be used to circum-
vent Robinson. Many communities are bypassing the Robinson mandate
by focusing on criminalizing conduct attendant to the status of home-
lessness.166 These statutes, like the one in Jones, allow the state to effec-
tuate the criminalization of the homeless just as the status/conduct
distinction did with homosexuality. In large part, the Powell plurality
has allowed this phenomenon to happen as it impliedly consented to
states punishing status if it was under the pretext of punishing con-
duct.167 Jones established that this is a meaningless distinction in the
context of the homeless and statutes banning sleeping, sitting, and
lying in public.168 Therefore, because the United States Supreme
Court has made clear that this distinction is no longer recognized in
relation to homosexuality, courts should follow suit and reject the use
of this defense for laws targeting the homeless and laws targeting the
poor more generally.169
160. Id. at 1138.
161. Id. at 1122–25.
162. Id. at 1138.
163. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136.
164. Id. at 1138.
165. Jones, 505 F.3d 1118.
166. Edward J. Walters, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection for Do-or-Die Acts of the
Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619 (1995).
167. Id. at 1619–20; see also Marco Masoni, The Common Good: A Critique of How Commu-
nities Are Addressing Panhandling, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 322, 325 (1994); Maya
Nordberg, Jails Not Homes: Quality of Life on the Streets of San Francisco, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 261, 272 (2002).
168. Jones, 444 F.3d 1118.
169. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971.
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IV. The Expansion of the Rational Basis Standard
“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect.”170 In 1970 these deafening words of
Justice Stewart rang out in Dandridge v. Williams.171 Justice Stewart
wrote the majority opinion, which applied the most deferential stan-
dard of review while upholding a law establishing a family cap on wel-
fare benefits.172 It was this landmark decision that relegated all social
welfare rights cases to the ever-deferential standard of rationality re-
view. However, the use of a less deferential version of the rational basis
test in cases advancing gay rights has perhaps opened the door for
social welfare rights to make strides while continuing to be evaluated
under this lowest level of scrutiny.
In Dandridge, the law specifically instituted a maximum grant reg-
ulation that limited the amount of money a family on welfare could
receive, regardless of the size of that family. Therefore, larger families
with greater need were not receiving adequate assistance.
Some of these larger families challenged the Maryland law as vio-
lating the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against them
based on family size.173 However, the Court quickly reiterated that any
law regulating social welfare need only a rational basis to survive.174 “If
the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with math-
ematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequal-
ity.’”175 The State put forth multiple ‘rational’ bases for the law but
the Court focused on two of them. First, the State argued that the
maximum grant regulation encouraged gainful employment by re-
quiring families to work to supplement the smaller grant received.176
Second, the State argued the family cap helped strike a balance be-
tween the economic status of wage earning families and families re-
ceiving welfare.177 The Court accepted both of these reasons as
legitimate governmental interests and justified the decision with these
sentiments: “We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is
170. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 473.
174. Id. at 485.
175. 397 U.S. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911)).
176. Id. at 483.
177. Id. at 483–84.
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wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives
that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane
system could not be devised.”178
“But the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State
must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not at-
tacking the problem at all.”179 This “one step at a time” rationale up-
holding the Maryland maximum grant regulation has continued to
plague the advancement of social welfare rights in cases applying only
the rational basis test. One example where the Dandridge school of
thought ruled the day is Jefferson v. Hackney.180 In Jefferson, the state of
Texas implemented a percentage reduction system, which gave a
lower percentage of the standard of need to persons on welfare then
to the aged, blind or disabled persons of other categorical assistance
programs. The Plaintiffs challenged the law as violating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because of the disproportionate effect on people of
color who were the vast majority of people on welfare and who in
large part were not receiving assistance from the other categorical
programs.181
Although race-based challenges under Equal Protection normally
receive strict scrutiny, here, the Plaintiffs could not prove the intent
necessary for a disparate impact claim. The Court stated that “[t]he
standard of judicial review is not altered because of appellants’ un-
proved allegations of racial discrimination.”182 Therefore, the Court
analyzed the law on the basis of its content, the area of social welfare,
which under Dandridge required deferential rational basis review.183
The Court then swiftly rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that the state
must apply the same percentage to each of its assistance programs.
Extensively citing Dandridge, Justice Rehnquist reiterated that the “leg-
islature may address a problem ‘one step at a time’ . . . so long as its
judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature’s efforts to
tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a
constitutional straightjacket.”184 Thus, the Court upheld the percent-
age reduction system under rational basis review stating that they
could not find the law to be “irrational.”185
178. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487.
179. Id. at 486.
180. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
181. Id. at 537–38.
182. Id. at 547.
183. Id. at 535.
184. Id. at 546.
185. 406 U.S. at 549.
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The one caveat in the Dandridge decision restricting the fight for
welfare rights to rational basis review was that the Court required the
law to be rationally based in addition to being “free from invidious
discrimination.”186 The 1973 welfare rights case, United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno,187 capitalized on this intuitive equal pro-
tection requirement. In Moreno, the Court determined the
constitutional validity of an amendment to one section of the Food
Stamp Act of 1964. The amendment excluded any household consist-
ing of unrelated individuals from receiving food stamps.188 The Gov-
ernment argued that the law should be upheld as it was rationally
related to the legitimate interest of minimizing fraud within the sys-
tem.189 However, the Court found they could not overlook the legisla-
tive history, which indicated “the amendment was intended to prevent
so called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the
food stamp program.”190 The Court held that at a minimum the Equal
Protection Clause means “that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest.”191 Therefore, even under rational basis review the
Court struck down the amendment to the Food Stamp Act as uncon-
stitutional.192 In distinguishing this decision from Dandridge, the
Court stated that “[t]raditonal equal protection analysis does not re-
quire that every classification be drawn with precise ‘mathematical ni-
cety.’ But the classification here in issue is not only ‘imprecise,’ it is
wholly without any rational basis.”193
This landmark decision written by Justice Brennan struck down a
law within the confines of what had been known as deferential ra-
tional basis review, creating a new rational basis review with bite. This
sleeper case about discrimination against hippies is the foundation for
the advancements of gay rights within the Equal Protection doctrine.
In 1996, Romer v. Evans194 followed the logic of Moreno and struck
down a law banning anti-discrimination protections for gays under ra-
tional basis review.195 Gays, like the poor, are not a class that is gener-
186. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487.
187. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
188. Id. at 530–31.
189. Id. at 535.
190. Id. at 534.
191. Id.
192. 413 U.S. at 538.
193. Id.
194. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
195. Id.
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ally granted heightened scrutiny, and as such they are both relegated
to the rational basis standard of review.196 Before Moreno, rational ba-
sis was a rubber stamp of a test leading to an inevitable victory for the
Government. However, in Romer, because the Court again saw animus
as the driving force of the law, it was less deferential and ultimately
overturned the law.197 Justice Kennedy aptly stated that the “laws of
the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disad-
vantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected.”198
Romer’s decision rested on its own for many years until 2003 when
Lawrence v. Texas reached the United States Supreme Court and Jus-
tice Kennedy again made use of ‘rational basis with bite.’199 In Law-
rence, the Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick200 and struck down a
same-sex specific sodomy ban.201 Unlike in Bowers, the Texas law at
issue in Lawrence specifically made reference to same-sex sodomy
rather than banning sodomy outright. This made the difference for
Justice O’Connor, who wrote a concurring opinion in which she de-
cided the case on equal protection grounds.202 However, Justice Ken-
nedy wrote the majority opinion invalidating the law under
substantive due process.203 This doctrinal difference distinguishes
Romer and Lawrence but does not detract from the fact that both deci-
sions struck down laws under what appears to be rationality review.
In Lawrence, the Court focused on the liberty interest in one’s pri-
vate life and the constitutional protection afforded to one’s personal
dignity and autonomy.204 The Court furthered this argument by refer-
encing landmark cases205 about the constitutional right to make per-
sonal decisions “relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.”206 However, the
Court declined to explicitly declare that a fundamental right was im-
plicated, which allowed Justice Kennedy to analyze the same-sex sod-
196. See id. at 653, n.1.
197. Id. at 644–46.
198. Id. at 634.
199. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
200. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
201. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
202. Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
203. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
204. Id.
205. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
206. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
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omy ban under rational basis.207 Although the Court avoided making
an actual declaration of the standard applied in the case, they did
state that “[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.”208 This language referencing rational basis established
Lawrence as another case advancing gay rights within the previously
limited framework of rational basis.
With same-sex marriage being arguably the most prominent con-
stitutional rights issue of the decade, Romer and Lawrence have become
increasingly more relevant. They have emerged as the touchstones of
every constitutional challenge involving gay rights, which means that
this new version of rationality review is at the center of the contro-
versy. The Proposition 8 trial in California is a perfect example of
this.209 In the Northern District of California, Judge Walker structured
his opinion striking down Proposition 8 with Romer and Lawrence in
mind. Although Judge Walker found that heightened scrutiny was due
under both substantive due process and equal protection, he analyzed
Proposition 8 under rational basis, and similarly found that it could
not pass muster under even this low standard of review.210 Using ra-
tional basis to strike down Proposition 8 was a huge victory for gay
rights advocates because of the history of strict deference under that
the rational basis standard. The strong statement being made in the
few cases that have refused to uphold laws under rationality review
demonstrates that the laws in question do not have even a legitimate
government interest in support.
This sentiment was echoed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision of Perry, which followed the same approach as Romer and de-
clined to apply heightened scrutiny.211 In deciding to invalidate Pro-
position 8, the court analogized the law to Amendment 2 from Romer,
which also stripped gays and lesbians of previously attained rights.212
The court stated that “[l]ike Amendment 2, Proposition 8 denies
‘equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense,’ because it
‘carves out’ an ‘exception’ to California’s equal protection clause by
207. Id. at 558.
208. Id. at 578.
209. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
210. Id. Under substantive due process Judge Walker found that Proposition 8 did in-
terfere with the fundamental right to marry, thus implicating strict scrutiny. Under equal
protection Judge Walker determined that gays do in fact meet the requirements to qualify
as a suspect class and again receive heightened scrutiny. Id. at 995.
211. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
212. See id. at 1080–85.
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removing equal access to marriage, which gays and lesbians had previ-
ously enjoyed, from the scope of that constitutional guarantee.”213
Further, the court explained that the decision not to apply height-
ened scrutiny to invalidate Proposition 8 was made because Romer did
not apply heightened scrutiny to invalidate Amendment 2.214
These cases demonstrate that the rational basis with bite standard
has become a benchmark in determining whether the Constitution
upholds or invalidates laws affecting gays. The breakthrough in ra-
tional basis review has had a definite impact on the momentum of the
gay rights movement and the progression seems to be continuing.
However, the standard is arguably becoming solely associated with gay
rights’ cases and Moreno has seemingly been forgotten along the way.
Moreno is still frequently cited in cases employing the stronger ration-
ality review; however, there is a suspicious lack of notice given to the
facts of Moreno. The traction that has developed for gay rights within
rationality review never began for social welfare rights, even though
the premiere case for rational basis with bite was a social welfare rights
case. Perhaps this is due to the fact that Moreno stood on its own
whereas Romer and Lawrence have created a strong one-two punch that
is much harder to dismiss. Further, the additional cases upholding gay
rights under rationality review have strengthened the doctrine. These
cases have breathed new life into the lowest level of scrutiny and this
will hopefully present opportunities to make strides in defending the
rights of the poor within rationality review.
Conclusion
These four areas of law demonstrate the notable advancements
the gay rights movement has made in recent years. Although gays lack
full protection of their equality and liberty, the history of the struggle
to attain their existing rights can be utilized to help the poor reach
similar heights. First, the extensive battle over same-sex marriage has
led to the recognition of the fallacies associated with responsible pro-
creation as an argument used to justify withholding marriage. This
change in political and perhaps social perceptions about the legiti-
macy of responsible procreation can be used to disrupt its use as a
response to single mothers on welfare. Second, the rise of laws pro-
tecting non-traditional families provides support for the idea that chil-
dren who are not raised in traditional nuclear families with one father
213. Id. at 1081.
214. Id. at n.13.
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and one mother can and do thrive. Third, the United State Supreme
Court’s firm decision to expel the conduct/status defense as it relates
to homosexuals makes a strong argument for discontinuing its use as
it relates to the homeless. Finally, the revival of Moreno’s rational basis
with bite standard has the potential to explode the current constitu-
tional protections of the Fourteenth Amendment for poor persons as
a class. The less deferential version of rationality review has been the
basis for many landmark decisions protecting the rights of gay people
and can be the impetus for changing the way in which constitutional
jurisprudence is approached.
